Review of Timothy Knepper, Negating Negation: Against the Apophatic Abandonment of the Dionysian Corpus (James Clarke & Co: Cambridge, 2015) by Marika Rose
Review of: Timothy Knepper, Negatng Negaton: Against the Apophatc Abandonment of the 
Dionysian Corpus (James Clarke & Co: Cambridge, 2014). ISBN 978-0-227-17455-5.
Knepper’s book is the latest in a line of publicatons by systematc theologians and scholars of 
patristcs who have responded somewhat bad-temperedly to the recent popularity of the work of 
Dionysius the Areopagite amongst philosophers of religion, seeking both to beneft from the 
revival of interest in Dionysius that these thinkers have generated and also to explain why, 
actually, Dionysius is not a radical thinker of revoluton and the disrupton of Christan orthodoxy 
but, in fact, a fairly conservatve theological thinker who values the hierarchies and insttutons of 
the church and does not wish to see them destroyed. Knepper bemoans the agendas which others
have brought to Dionysius’ text, setng himself against those who want to fnd resources in 
Dionysius for advocatng religious pluralism or opposing onto-theology. Instead, he wants to 
establish what ideas about God and language emerge when we allow the Dionysian corpus to 
‘speak for itself’ without being ‘overwhelmed by strong interpretve rubrics, be they personal or 
historical in nature’ (xvi). Some of the philosophers Knepper implicitly takes aim at would queston
the possibility of the kind of agenda-free reading he claims to be ofering; but it is not only their 
reading of Dionysius that Knepper is happy to dismiss without seriously engaging.
 
The heart of Knepper’s argument is the claim that, where contemporary philosophers of religion 
tend towards linguistc nominalism – the idea that the relatonship between names and the things 
they name is ultmately arbitrary – no such assumptons can be made of Dionysius. For Dionysius, 
there are two types of name for God: names taken from perceptual things, which functon 
metaphorically or symbolically (so, for example, we say God is a rock because God is steadfast); 
and the ‘divine names’ which are not simply names but which God is insofar as God is the cause of 
certain propertes in the world (God isn’t steadfast in the same way as a rock, but is the divine 
name ‘rest-itself’, the cause of steadfastness insofar as it exists in the world). We can remove 
divine names from God insofar as they apply to God’s efects in the world: God causes 
steadfastness in the world but is not that steadfasteness in the world. We cannot remove them 
from God insofar as they apply to God as the cause of things in the world; God really is rest itself, 
the cause of steadfastness. However limited our ability, as created beings, to grasp God fully as the
cause of our being, the connecton between our existence, our naming of God as the cause of our 
existence, and what God really is in Godself is not arbitrary. This means that God is not so radically
diferent than the world that all our language is equally inadequate; it does not mean, say, than all 
doctrinal dispute is ultmately pointless, or that all religion are ultmately the same. Dionysius 
holds that our knowledge of God is limited, but he does not think we can or should abandon 
classical Christan doctrine, the hierarchies of church government, or the sacraments. 
Knepper’s book ofers a careful, close reading of Dionysius, which is ofen illuminatng. What 
emerges from his reading is, I think quite rightly, a Dionysius who is not straightorwardly a 
resource for radical projects of overthrowing Christan doctrine and hierarchies. What is 
frustratng about the book its framing. Knepper positons himself as a critc of contemporary 
philosophers of religion, but his detailed critcal engagement barely touches on many major 
discussions about Dionysius in contemporary philosophy of religion. Many philosophical readers of
Dionysius are, in fact, far from the simplistc advocates of apophatc abandonment that Knepper 
takes them to be. Jean-Luc Marion’s reading of Dionysius fnds in him a deeply conservatve and 
hierarchical reading of Christan theology which bears many similarites to Knepper’s vision; 
Jacques Derrida denies that Dionysian negaton is the same as his project of deconstructon 
precisely because he sees Dionysian negaton as ultmately in service to a project of afrmaton, of 
re-inscribing Christan ideas about God, much as Knepper himself argues. Contemporary 
theological responses to discussions of Dionysius within contemporary philosophy ofen fail to 
recognise the seriousness with which many contemporary philosophers reads Dionysius; it is a 
shame that Knepper is no excepton. 
